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National Intelligence Daily

Saturday 14 April 1979

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| LIBYA: Costs of Uganda Venture The failure of Libya's intervention in Uganda will accelerate the decline of Chief of State Qadhafi's popularity at home, both with the public and, more significantly, within the military. | 25X1 25X1 |
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| Libyan media deny that Tripoli sent troops to Uganda, and the Foreign Ministry has instructed all Libyan missions to maintain that line. The number of casualties will nevertheless make it impossible to keep the debacle from the public, particularly because many of the soldiers were militiamen-basically civilian reservists who, according to some reports, were flown to Uganda without advance notice and were thrust into the difficult military situation. | - - - , |
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| SPECIAL ANALYSIS | - |
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| ARAB RADICALS - EGYPT: A Widening Confrontation | |
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| Arab hardliners, determined to isolate Egyptian President Sadat, are energetically pressing for implementation of the sanctions voted against Egypt at the Arab ministerial meeting in Baghdad late last month. Momentum | - |
| is clearly in their favor; most of Egypt's supporters have given way in the face of threats and a judgment that | |
| their security requires them to support the Arab consensus. Egyptian officials are on the defensive. | 25X1 |
| Iraq, Syria, Libya, and the Palestine Liberation Organization are taking the lead in ensuring that the anti-Egyptian sanctions are carried out. Iraq, in particular, seems bent on seeking additional ways of retaliating against Sadat for making peace with Israel. In the | - |
| past few days a wide range of actions have been reported: | 25X1 |
| Arabs and Cubans are supporting a move to oust Egypt from the Nonaligned Move-ment. | |
| | 25X1 |
| Iraq has called for expelling Egypt from the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries. | |
| Radical Arabs are recommending the ex- clusion of Egypt from the Organization of African Unity and the Group of 77. | |
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| | The International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions on 7 April decided to boycott Eqyptianand USmeans of transportation. The hardliners are also seeking to use their lever- age with Egypt's non-Arab aid donors. | 25X1 |
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| Ц | • | <u>25</u> X1 |
| | Egyptian officials are projecting a self-confident, aggressive image. | |
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| | Egyptian strategy is to play for time in the hope that differences among members will erode the anti-Egypt bloc and that future Egyptian-Israeli negotiations will yield results on the important West Bank - Gaza autonomy issue. | 25X1 |
| | however | |
| 0.5)// | | |
| 25X1 | No Arab state has provided enthusiastic backing for Egypt, and those that privately support Sadat's initiativeOman, Sudan, and perhaps North Yemenhave little influence in Arab circles. Each of these governments, moreover, is vulnerable to threats of subversionthreats the hardliners employed successfully at the recent Baghdad conference and at the Arab summit there last fall to ensure an Arab consensus in favor of tough sanctions. | |
| | Iraqi radio has broadcast statements by the "Sudanese Baath Party" hostile to President Numayri. Oman's | |
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| worries about its security were sharply increased by the public threat of Iraqi leader Saddam Husayn on the eve of the Baghdad conference to work for the overthrow of those aligned with Sadat and by the recent South Yemeni aggression against North Yemen. The Baghdad meeting also made clear that Sadat can expect little support for now from such longstanding allies as Morocco, Tunisia, the Gulf shaykhdoms, and Saudi Arabia. | 25X1 |
| Developments since the Baghdad meeting continue the trends established in the Arab world since Sadat visited Jerusalem. The Arab consensus has shifted steadily toward the hardliners' position under a combination of pressure from Iraq, Syria, and the PLO, and a widespread conviction that an Egyptian-Israeli treaty is a separate peace, not the beginning of a comprehensive settlement. The question is no longer whether the Arabs will support the Camp David accords but rather how stringently they | |
| At each point of decision, Arab moderates—whatever their private preference—have chosen refuge in a common Arab position defined largely by the hardliners. In effect, there has ceased to be a middle ground from which the moderates can argue for restraint. | 25X1 |
| Iraq has been the big winner. Egypt, for now, has taken itself out of the competition for leadership of the Arab world and Syria, bogged down in Lebanon, faces important military and economic difficulties. Iraq, on the other hand, has good economic resources, a seemingly stable domestic environment, ideological commitment, and two recent diplomatic successes—the forging of a tough consensus position at Baghdad and the arranging of a cease—fire in the Yemens. Over the past year, Baghdad has also strengthened relations with Fatah and the Syrians, enlisted the cooperation of Jordan, and put Saudi Arabia and other moderates on the defensive. | 25X1 |

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OVERNIGHT REPORTS

(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not been coordinated within the intelligence community. They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current Operations with analyst comment where possible from the production offices of NFAC.)

China-Vietnam

Beijing Xinhua reports that the Chinese delegation to the border talks with Vietnam arrived today in Hanoi. Negotiations between the two governments will take place at the vice-ministerial level with vice-minister of Foreign Affairs Han Nianlong heading the Chinese delegation.

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